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COMMENTARY
DOMINATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
DISTRICT: THE STATEHOOD POSITION
Jamin B. Raskin*
"To secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, de-
riving their just powers from the consent of the governed. "
Declaration of Independence
Albert Camus once wrote: "One day a slave who has been taking orders
all his life suddenly decides that he cannot obey some new command . .. "
and so he says, "no more."' The moment of break through recognition and
defiance described by Camus has arrived to topple dictators and repressive
political regimes everywhere, speading democratic practices and the spirit of
freedom throughout the world. This moment may also be approaching fi-
nally in the District of Columbia, the Nation's Capital, where Congress in
1862 first abolished slavery in the United States, and the Nation's last col-
ony, where the movement against second-class citizens and for statehood is
slowly gaining political momentum in 1990. This Commentary sets forth
the case for District of Columbia statehood in constitutional and legal
terms.2 It explains why no legislative reform of the current legal regime will
suffice to vindicate principles of American federalism as they relate to citi-
zens living in the District of Columbia. This Commentary also attempts to
refute Professor Seidman's double-barreled argument that statehood for the
people of the District would be superfluous because "current legal doctrine,
* Mr. Raskin, former General Counsel to the National Rainbow Coalition and Assis-
tant Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, is an Assistant Professor of
Law at the Washington College of Law at American University. J.D., Harvard Law School,
1987; A.B., Harvard College, 1983. The author would like to thank Sarah Bloom, Joseph
Johnson, Marcus Raskin, Michael Fortunato, and Reverend Jesse Jackson for their encourage-
ment and support, and Hilda Mason and Jo Butler for their unswerving devotion to the state-
hood cause.
1. A. CAMUS, THE REBEL 13 (A. Bower trans. 2d ed. 1956).
2. For the more explicitly political argument for District of Columbia statehood, see
Jackson, Foreword. The State of New Columbia - A Callfor Justice and Freedom, 39 CATH.
U.L. REV. 307 (1990).
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properly understood, already provides the District with many of the protec-
tions that supposedly would come with statehood" and would be ineffective
because "statehood standing alone would not provide a significant legal bul-
wark against congressional domination."3 In fact, this Commentary argues,
current legal doctrine provides the District with practically none of the pro-
tections that accompany statehood, and statehood would provide substan-
tial, if not complete, insurance against congressional domination and
discrimination. This Commentary then considers the strategic suggestions
of Professor Schrag for the statehood movement4 and proposes an alterna-
tive path. This path would continue the statehood initiative process pres-
ently in motion and accelerate it with mass organizing and public protest to
dramatize and transform the District's oppressed condition.5 Finally, this
Commentary evaluates as an intermediary strategy for obtaining statehood
the plan recently proposed by Representative Stan Parris of Virginia to give
District residents the right to vote in federal elections in the State of
Maryland.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL THEORIES
SUPPORTING STATEHOOD
"The tangled web of democracy in the District of Columbia is not easy to
sort out or unravel." '6 It is abundantly clear, nonetheless, both as a matter of
constitutional interpretation and American political history, that the consti-
tutional provisions and federal law governing the District of Columbia guar-
antee national political domination of the local population. The United
States Constitution's district clause, article I, section 8, clause 17, states that
Congress shall exercise "exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by cession of particu-
lar States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Govern-
ment of the United States . . . . This categorical constitutional grant of
power permits a double form of political domination by Congress that has
given rise to the District population's intimate historical familiarity with ar-
bitrary rule, colonial insult, and official contempt.'
3. Seidman, The Preconditions for Home Rule, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 371 (1990).
4. Schrag, The Future of District of Columbia Home Rule, 39 CATH. U.L. REV. 311, 350
(1990).
5. See infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
6. United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Mikva, J., concurring).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
8. The District population's mistreatment at the hands of Congress is well-known. See
Schrag supra note 4, at 312-16. For example, four years after African-American males were
given the right to vote in local elections, the Congress, in 1871, simply abolished the elected
mayor and council, replacing them with a governor and council appointed by the President.
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First, its constitutional "plenary power" over the District affords Con-
gress complete authority to exercise "powers as local sovereign . . ,,9 The
congressional role of "local sovereign" displaces and supplants whatever
rights of political autonomy might be secured to District residents by the
tenth amendment, the republican guaranty clause, or any other right argua-
bly inherent in the existence of a local community of American citizens.I°
The delegation of legislative power to the District of Columbia Council
through the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reor-
ganization (Home Rule) Act"1 leaves these essential dynamics of power in-
tact because this delegation is "neither complete nor irrevocable."' 12 Section
601 of the Home Rule Act reserves to Congress "the right, at any time, to
exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District on any sub-
ject . .. including legislation to amend or repeal any law in force in the
District ...and any act passed by the Council."' 3 Moreover, in a more
fundamental sense, Congress always retains its plenary constitutional au-
thority and thus can simply abolish the Home Rule Act itself. 4
Second, the United States Constitution's district clause has also been in-
terpreted to give Congress the authority to treat District residents differently
than the residents of the other fifty states from the standpoint of federal
legislation.' 5 In United States v. Cohen, the United States Court of Appeals
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, HISTORIC HIGHLIGHTS 9 (1986). Congress
did not see fit to give District residents the right to vote for President until 1961. Id. See also
U.S. CONST. amend XXIII.
9. Cohen, 733 F.2d at 141, 144. The District clause has been interpreted to give "Con-
gress near-plenary authority over the structure of the government in the District." Clark v.
United States, 886 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 485 U.S. 50, 76 (1982); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 397-
98 (1973).
10. The tenth amendment does not furnish a source of indigenous rights for American
citizens living within the District because it provides only that the "powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution ... are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend X (emphasis supplied). Meanwhile, the republican guaranty clause ap-
plies only to the people of the "states." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Even Judge Mikva, perhaps
the most sympathetic judge the people of the District have on the bench, concurs with that
conclusion. See Cohen, 733 F.2d at 146. With these general grants of democratic local power
removed, the powers claimed by way of the District clause easily prevail over any other claim
to inherent rights of self-government.
11. Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973), reprinted in I D.C. CODE ANN. at 175 [here-
inafter Home Rule Act].
12. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 407.
13. Home Rule Act, supra note 13, § 601.
14. Clarke, 886 F.2d at 407. The prospect of Congress abolishing home rule is neither
unprecedented, see HISTORIC HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 8, at 9, nor currently unthinkable, see
135 CONG. REC. H4918 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. DeLay).
15. See Cohen, 733 F.2d at 139.
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for the District of Columbia Circuit held that discriminatory federal treat-
ment of District residents triggers neither fifth amendment "strict scrutiny"
nor "intermediate scrutiny," but merely "rational basis scrutiny.",1 6 The
court then punctured even this weak standard of review, stating that, "in a
sense the Constitution itself establishes the rationality of [a discriminatory]
classification, by providing a separate federal power which reaches only the
present group."1 7 The court came to this circular conclusion by considering
the constitutionality of legislation that discriminates against District resi-
dents through the lens of congressional powers instead of from the stand-
point of individual rights. Judge Mikva, in his concurrence, remarked that
the
majority transforms Congress' 'plenary power' over the District of
Columbia into a talisman that gives Congress carte blanche to treat
District inhabitants as appropriate specimens for all sorts of experi-
mental national legislation .... Congress is ceded virtually unfet-
tered authority to single out District of Columbia inhabitants for
disparate treatment under federal statutory schemes. 18
16. Id. at 132-36. In Cohen, the court upheld the congressionally-enacted District statute
that required the committal to mental institutions of District criminal defendants acquitted by
reason of insanity. Id. at 138-39.
17. Id. at 139.
18. Id. at 141, 144. A schizophrenic social vision of the District of Columbia informs the
majority decision in Cohen. At times, the local population is implicitly likened to children, id.
at 135 ("even if one accepts the thesis that the class in question is residents of the District of
Columbia, the mere lack of the ballot does not establish political powerlessness, or, if it does,
political powerlessness alone is not enough for 'suspect class' status. Minors, for example, are
not a suspect class.") (emphasis supplied, citations omitted), or other historically disfavored
and oppressed groups, such as American Indians. Id. at 139. But, at other times, the court
seems to take judicial notice of Washington's power elite, a social stratum the existence of
which apparently renders the rest of the populace's need for rights unnecessary. Id. at 135 ("It
is, in any event, fanciful to consider as 'politically powerless' a city whose residents include a
high proportion of the officers of all three branches of the federal government, and their
staffs."). The court's apparent bedazzlement by an elite group "within which the most politi-
cally powerful members of society are particularly likely to be included" blocks its attention
from the fact that the District population is overwhelmingly made up of ordinary citizens who
neither occupy high federal office nor work in the Federal Government. The District's history
of political domination would indicate that the effectively disenfranchised local population,
which is majority African-American and plagued by the nation's highest illiteracy rate, highest
high school drop-out rate, and highest infant mortality rate, should be considered a "suspect
class" within the meaning of Plyer v. Doe for the purpose of equal protection. The District
population, which did not even vote in presidential elections until 1961, has "historically been
'relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process.' " Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 217 n.14 (quoting San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Roderiquez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). But, of course, the court




Therefore, from the standpoint of both basic self-governance and the right
of equal treatment as a political community, the relationship of the District
to Congress does not at all resemble the relationship of the States to Con-
gress. Nor is the relationship even comparable to the unequal and im-
balanced relationship of other American cities to the State legislatures which
charter them. The inhabitants of other cities at least vote for representatives
to their State legislatures and thus possess a kind of interlocking check
against state abuse of local prerogatives and interests.'" But District resi-
dents have no voting representation in the national legislative body that ulti-
mately controls their land, their laws, and even their lives. Without any
meaningful voice in the legislative process, without the semblance of par-
ticipatory equality, the people of the District have no check against legisla-
tive tyranny.
20
The federal disenfranchisement, subjugation, and taxation of the District
population plainly offend the root principle of democracy enshrined in the
Declaration of Independence: that all just powers derive from the consent of
the governed.2 1
It should be axiomatic by now that, because the constitutional structure
assures federal domination over the District, there can be no truly effective
or durable reform of the current system. As Professor Seidman correctly
notes before coming to very different conclusions than are reached here,
"Real sovereignty is indivisible, irrevocable, and unconditional."2 2  Of
course, as Seidman recognizes, sovereignty is often quite divided, tentative,
provisional, and conditional. But District citizens, living even under the ex-
panded home rule suggested by Professor Schrag,23 cannot be sovereign to
any meaningful degree within the structure of congressional control created
by the District clause. Even if the District went from congressional scape-
19. The Supreme Court has long held that all municipal power is derivated from the state,
and that state legislative power is plenary except if limited by State or Federal Constitution.
See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are polit-
ical subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the govern-
mental powers of the State as may be intrusted to them."); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore,
289 U.S. 36, 40, 53 (1933) (stating that a municipal corporation possesses "no privileges or
immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of its
creator").
20. Indeed, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals inadvertently suggested the better
analogy for the political situation of District residents in Cohen. There the court justified the
different treatment of the District under federal law by comparing congressional power over
the District population to congressional power over the the American Indian population. See
Cohen, 733 F.2d at 139. America's Indian population has, of course, been subject to brutality,
systematic displacement, slaughter, and governmental oppression.
21. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
22. Seidman, supra note 3, at 371.
23. See generally Schrag, supra note 4.
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goat to congressional darling overnight and Congress magically granted all
of the reforms suggested by Professor Schrag,24 the continuance of the popu-
lation's federal legislative disenfranchisement and Congress' final control
over local legislation would still render the local populace more subjects
than citizens. At any rate, the "piecemeal approach" of struggling to gain
greater autonomy in six spheres of "diminished political rights" is politically
unlikely to succeed, easily reversible if it did, potentially damaging to the
cause of statehood in the meantime, and essentially unthreatening to the
structure of political subjection of the District population.2"
In the final analysis, however, the simple fact that the citizens of the Dis-
trict have already decided to seek complete and lasting political equality by
way of statehood rather than to place their eggs in the shaky basket of piece-
meal reform constitutes the dispositive departure point.26 To acquire the
political rights enjoyed by American citizens living in the fifty states, the
24. Id. at 322-45.
25. Schrag's useful taxonomy identifies the areas of "diminished rights" as: "voting repre-
sentation in Congress, legislative autonomy, budget authority, judicial self-determination, con-
trol over criminal prosecution, and the ability to preserve or change the basic political system."
Id. at 322.
But, given the current condition of federal-District affairs, legislative reform in any of these
areas can only be regarded as extremely unlikely. The timid posture of constantly seeking
minor concessions in a colonial context invites contempt and reinforces the basic power dy-
namics at work. Each bill to expand local control over criminal prosecution will be an oppor-
tunity for grandstanding about the crime rate in the District, just as every request for greater
legislative autonomy will be an invitation to revisit the pre-arrest adventures of Mayor Barry.
LaFraniere, Barry Arrested on Cocaine Charges in Undercover FBI, Police Operation; Sources
Say Mayor Used Crack in Downtown D.C Hotel Room, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1990, at A 1, col. 1.
The piecemeal reform agenda could in fact expose the people of the District to more ridicule
and more legislative interference than they presently experience.
Even if Congress approved piecemeal reforms, the people of the District still would not
enjoy full political rights, either as American citizens or as an American city or State. For
example, if Congress provided that, for local laws involving the criminal code or prisoners, it
could "discharge its District committees from further consideration of repealing resolutions
only as a result of the action of a majority of the body" instead of the petition of one member,
that still leaves in place the basic structure of control. Congress could still repeal District of
Columbia legislation, a possibility that the inhabitants of no other American city must face.
At any rate, under the current regime, what reforms Congress giveth so can it taketh away.
Reforms under a vertical power relationship are inherently unstable and never should be con-
sidered as a long-term solution. As Professor Schrag correctly notes:
Legally, neither repeal of the restrictions on District legislative power nor elimina-
tion of a specified period for congressional review of District laws would protect the
District's Council from federal second-guessing. Unless the District becomes a state,
the United States Constitution would continue to give Congress the right to exercise
plenary legislative authority over the District. Accordingly, Congress could overturn
any act of the Council at any time.
Schrag, supra note 4, at 332.




people living under congressional rule must escape the geographic and polit-
ical boundaries of the District of Columbia and form their own State. This is
the emancipatory political project defined by the nascent state of New Co-
lumbia, whose citizens ratified the constitution by referendum on November
2, 1982, and sent it to Congress in September 1983.27
The current statehood bills before the House of Representatives and the
United States Senate would redraw the lines of the District of Columbia so
that the District would include only the so-called "Federal Enclave," which
includes the White House, the Capitol Building, the congressional office
buildings, the United States Supreme Court Building, the principal federal
monuments, and other federal buildings.2" The remaining land mass between
the District and Maryland would be recognized by Congress and admitted to
the American union as the State of New Columbia.29 It is important to note
the exact structure of this solution because the effect of the proposal is not,
as popularly supposed, to promote the District of Columbia to statehood,
but rather to negotiate a kind of popular exodus from congressional domina-
tion into statehood by radically restricting the land taken in by the bounda-
ries of the District of Columbia.3°
The statehood solution, therefore, does not assume that congressional con-
trol over the seat of the Federal Government amounts to an inherently nega-
tive or oppressive constitutional feature, unique though it may be in the
constitutional designs of contemporary democratic states.31 In fact, the dis-
trict clause had an intelligible genesis in the Founders' concern that no indi-
vidual State dominate through proximity and police power the workings of
the National Government. This concern was apparently heightened in June
1783 when an unruly band of disgruntled Revolutionary War soldiers who
had not been compensated for their services threatened Congress. Ignoring
27. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW COLUMBIA, 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 72-116
(Cum. Supp. 1989).
28. H.R. 51, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Congress fixed the Federal enclave boundaries
in District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, § 3739(a)-
(f), Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973), reprinted in 1 D.C. CODE ANN. at 175, 235-41
(National Capital Service Area).
29. Senators Kennedy and Simon are expected soon to introduce similar legislation in the
Senate.
30. For a provocative examination of the political meaning of the Exodus story, see
WALZER, ExODUS AND REVOLUTION (1986). The shrewd and skeptical questions raised by
Edward Said in "Michael Walzer's Exodus and Revolution: A Canaanite Reading," in E. SAID
& C. HITCHENS, BLAMING THE VICTIMS (1988), however, provide a haunting look at the dark
side of "exodus politics" and liberation through statehood. Both images of the statehood pro-
cess should be contemplated by statehood advocates.
31. The United States is the only nation on earth that denies representation in its National
Legislature to citizens living in the Capital City. D.C. STATEHOOD COALITION, To FORM A
MORE PERFECT UNION: D.C. STATEHOOD Now! (1990) [hereinafter STATEHOOD Now!].
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the call from Congress, the Governor of Pennsylvania refused to dispatch its
State militia to suppress the protest. This fateful event influenced the Fram-
ers' decision to carve out a relatively small piece of land, "no greater than
ten miles square," that would be the "Seat of Government" under the exclu-
sive control of the Congress.32 This arrangement was suitable in 1800 when
the States were in fact much stronger, the Federal Government much
weaker, and the District of Columbia had only 3,200 residents. The Dis-
trict's meager population amounted to generally part-time residents over-
whelmingly composed of federal office-holders. It could not have qualified
for statehood even if the residents constituted a self-identified, independent
political community because at that time, statehood required 60,000 citizens
and 30,000 for the establishment of a congressional district.33
What made sense in 1800, however, is insensible and indefensible today.
Far from being weak and vunerable, the Federal Government now repre-
sents a large entity sprawling all over Virginia and Maryland (not to men-
tion other states), as well as the District. The District of Columbia boasts a
population larger than each of five other States. It has a diverse economy
and a vibrant local political community seeking full political rights through
statehood. The Foreword by Reverend Jesse Jackson captures the modern
realities of the District that make statehood the most satisfactory solution.34
As Professor Schrag so carefully demonstrates, and as the Committee on the
District of Columbia found in 1987," 5 the Constitution does not bar passing
statehood for New Columbia while reserving to Congress exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the newly drawn District of Columbia. We can thus reconcile the
basic citizenship rights of District citizens with the Framers' contemplation
of physical and political distance between individual States and the Federal
Government.
32. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
33. STATEHOOD Now!, supra note 31.
34. Jackson, supra note 2. Assuming the injustice of the disempowerment and effective
disenfranchisement of the people of the District, it is still possible, of course, to arrive at polit-
ical conclusions other than statehood. Professor Schrag usefully canvasses the alternatives to
statehood, finding that retrocession to Maryland, recently proposed by Congressman Ralph
Regula, is probably not politically viable, despite Governor Schaefer's recent statements wel-
coming a return of the lands Maryland ceded to the Federal Government in 1788. Schrag,
supra note 4, at 318-20; Baker, Schaefer Invites the District to Reattach Itself to Maryland,
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1990, at A6, col. 1. But Professor Schrag's instincts on this question seem
generally more sound: The majority of District residents favor statehood, as established by the
referendum in 1981, and evince no enthusiasm about "returning" to Maryland, while most
Marylanders seem to be taking the position that one Baltimore is enough. Schrag, supra note
4, at 320 & n.5. The possibility of a new state composed of "Montgomery and Prince George's
Counties in Maryland, and the northern counties of Virginia" seems even more farfetched. Id.
at 321.
35. H.R. REP. No. 305, 100th Cong., ist Sess. 21-23.
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II. THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE OF STATEHOOD
As the foregoing suggests, statehood represents the only authentic form of
political equality for American citizens living in the District of Columbia.
Professor Seidman very well describes the accelerating interference with the
affairs of the people of the District over the last several years, the continuing
and humiliating price of life in the "Seat of Government." 36 Yet, Seidman
exerts considerable energy to diminish the meaning and importance of state-
hood. He argues that "current legal doctrine, properly understood, already
provides the District with many of the protections that supposedly would
accompany statehood"37 and that, at any rate, "statehood standing alone
would not provide a significant legal bulwark against congressional domina-
tion."3 These claims, divorced from legal and political reality, are simply
too clever by half and cannot survive critical scrutiny.
Seidman contends that statehood represents the wrong focus because con-
gressional legislation regarding the District of Columbia must already obey
"a single overarching constitutional principle: Congress may not enact legis-
lation that is the product of the political impotence of the District and its
residents. Although Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate, it
lacks the constitutional authority to dominate."3 9 Regardless of the attrac-
tiveness or intelligibility of this principle, it is wholly without basis in the law
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
and the Supreme Court, in its current conservative disposition, almost cer-
tainly would reject it. In Cohen, the court of appeals restated its acceptance
of not only complete congressional control by Congress over the District's
local affairs but Congress' power to develop federal policies that treat Dis-
trict residents differently from other citizens. The court subjected federal
legislation discriminating against the District to a "mere rationality test"
under the equal protection clause and embraced the tautological principle
that "in a sense the Constitution itself establishes the rationality" of classifi-
cations that discriminate against the District "by providing a separate fed-
eral power which reaches only the present group."4 °
Thus, in doctrinal terms, the "constitutional authority to legislate" for the
District actually encompasses "the constitutional authority to dominate" it.
Seidman's attempt to draw a legal distinction between legislation and domi-
36. Seidman, supra note 3, at 373-75. Such interference takes the form of both direct
congressional veto of D.C. legislation and the use of appropriations riders to control the partic-
ulars of local affairs. Id.
37. Id. at 376.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 378.
40. United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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nation in this regard represents a bit of jurisprudential wishful thinking
neither grounded in extant constitutional law nor capable of any principled a
priori definition. From a political standpoint, all legislation by a foreign sov-
ereign, whether benevolent or hostile in the eyes of local resident, by defini-
tion constitutes a form of domination. From the perspective of Congress, all
of its District legislation is simply "legislation"; from the perspective of Dis-
trict residents, it is all "domination."
Thus, all congressional legislation concerning the local affairs of the peo-
ple of the District "is the product of the political impotence of the District
and its residents."'' 4 The people of no other city or State must endure the
rule of Congress over local matters like a commuter tax, a tax on non-resi-
dent income, the hours swimming pools are to be open, the spending of local
monies on abortion, and the like.42 The people of no other city or State must
endure federal policies that discriminate against them as unequal to other
American citizens. The District population would not endure these indigni-
ties and injustices either if not for its own "political impotence."
As a normative matter, Seidman correctly anticipates both methodologi-
cal and philosophical objections to his thesis favoring the justiciability of
legislation that crosses the line to domination. "Such an effort," he con-
cedes, "requires judges to imagine a fully representational hypothetical polit-
ical process with participants authentically committed to discovering and
implementing the public good. Then judges must predict what legislation
such a process would produce." 43 Leaving aside the epistemological problem
of predicting the result of a process that never existed and never will exist,
the legislation-versus-domination thesis misreads the proper function of the
judicial branch. The judicial branch does not determine whether specific
legislative results live up to a hypothetical "best legislative solution"
(whatever that may be), but rather judge whether those results violate de-
fined constitutional rights or boundaries. A court simply has no institutional
competence to overturn a "bad" or imperfect legislative result that is within
the authority of the legislature to pass.
Seidman's position encloses no limiting principle to constrain judicial ac-
tivism. Based on his theory, any court with procedural jurisdiction could
overturn any legislation that the judge believes does not sufficiently imple-
ment the hypothetical "public good." But turning judges into super-legisla-
tors contradicts the premise of both representative and participatory
democracy, in which the prevailing assumption is that the public good
41. Seidman, supra note 3, at 378.
42. See generally Schrag, supra note 4, at Appendix.
43. Seidman, supra note 3, at 402.
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emerges from an actual, as opposed to hypothetical, public dialogue inform-
ing the electoral and legislative processes." At any rate, the hypothetical
public good, the one envisioned by citizens meeting in John Rawls' "original
position"45 can never quite be achieved because the "veil of ignorance" con-
cealing from citizens their personal fortunes does not exist at any actual
point in history. But our constitutional system gambles that the open and
imperfect processes of the legislative branch capture the spirit of the com-
mon good and democratic progress better than the politically impervious
and inscrutable process of judical review.
Professor Seidman, however, is still right, as a matter of constitutional
law, to observe that the District power, "like all of Congress' Article I pow-
ers, is subject to restraints contained in the rest of the Constitution."4 6 But
surely he is wrong to conclude from this observation that "properly under-
stood, these restraints sweep broadly indeed, providing the District with pro-
tection against violations of home rule that virtually equal the protections
the District would enjoy as a State."47
To see why Seidman is right as to his first assertion and wrong about his
second, consider the following hypothetical (and not-so-hypothetical) exam-
ples. The United States Congress could not constitutionally bar African-
Americans from use of the swimming pool at the Woodrow Wilson High
School in Northwest Washington because federal racial discrimination vio-
lates the fifth amendment. In this sense, the citizens of the District possess
the same federal constitutional rights as the citizens of other states. But the
Congress can, and did, close the swimming pool at the Woodrow Wilson
High School to the general public after 9:00 p.m.48 In this sense, the citizens
of the District as a political community surely lack the same "protection
against violations of home rule" enjoyed by citizens of the States.
We can quickly reproduce the examples. The Congress could not impose
the death penalty on District taxicab drivers who place meters in their cabs
44. See, e.g., BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW (1989) (a conservative and not altogether compelling rendering of this basic democratic
principle).
45. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
46. Seidman, supra note 3, at 378. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit articulated the position in United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), that "Congress' power over the District, like all powers in our system of govern-
ment, has constitutional limits ... it is no response to contend.., that Congress was exercising
its 'plenary power' when it created.., an irrational classification." Id. at 1338. The court cast
some doubt on this principle generally in Cohen and clearly tossed it away as it relates to Equal
Protection. United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
47. Seidman, supra note 3, at 378.
48. District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-405, 88 Stat. 822, 826
(1974) (1975 Appropriation).
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(it would offend the eighth amendment), but the Congress has constitution-
ally used the District power to forbid installation of meters in District cabs
in the first place.4 9 The Congress could not prevent women from attending
law school at the University of the District of Columbia, but it could prevent
the city from ever having a law school at the University of the District of
Columbia. In short, the citizens of the District have almost the same consti-
tutional rights as individuals as residents of the States. They lack as a polit-
ical community the rights the people of the States have to self-governance on
the local level without congressional interference, the rights the people of the
States have to equal treatment by Congress under the fifth amendment, and
the rights of representation in Congress to prevent national usurpations of
local prerogatives.
Professor Seidman's avoidance of these fundamental political and legal
realities reduces the utility of his intriguing treatment of Clarke v. United
States.50 Seidman employs Clarke as a "case study" to demonstrate the
proposition that constitutional side restraints already operate to "provide[ ]
the District with many of the protections that supposedly would accompany
statehood."'" Mobilizing a number of constitutional arguments to his posi-
tion, Seidman argues that even if Congress had enacted the Armstrong
amendment directly instead of unconstitutionally coercing members of the
District's council to vote for it, the new law would have been struck down.
Although this outcome is uncertain, Seidman produces compelling argu-
49. See 1975 Appropriation, 88 Stat. at 827; District of Columbia Appropriation Act,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-333, 90 Stat. 785, 791 (1975) (1976 Appropriation); District of Columbia
Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-446, 90 Stat. 1490, 1494 (1976); District of Columbia
Appropriation Act, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 92 Stat. 281, 287 (1977) (1978 Appropriation);
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-373, 92 Stat. 699, 704 (1978)
(1979 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-93, 93
Stat. 713, 717 (1979) (1980 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1981,
Pub. L. No. 96-530, 94 Stat. 3121, 3126 (1980) (1981 Appropriation); District of Columbia
Appropriation Act, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-91, 95 Stat. 1173, 1180 (1981) (1982 Appropriation);
District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-378, 96 Stat. 1925, 1931 (1982)
(1983 Appropriation); District of Columbia Appropriation Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-125, 97
Stat. 819, 825 (1983) (1984 Appropriation); Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1837 (citing H.R. 5899, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 23,737, 23,739 (1984)) (1985
Continuing Appropriations) (1985 Appropriation); Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190,
99 Stat. 1185, 1224 (citing H.R. 3067, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. 31,088, 31,090
(1985) (1986 Continuing Appropriations) (1986 Appropriation).
50. 886 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
51. Seidman, supra note 3, at 376. This argument is especially overstated since the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's decision Clarke v. United States
was based on the narrow holding that the Armstrong amendment, which required members of
the District council to vote a certain way, violated their first amendment "right to vote freely
on issues as they arise." Clarke, 886 F.2d at 411.
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ments that the law would violate the establishment clause. 52 And yet this
elegant bit of lawyering begs the central question. While the establishment
clause might prevent Congress from exempting only religiously-based educa-
tional institutions from the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Human
Rights Act, no extrinsic constitutional principle could keep the Congress
from simply repealing the entire Human Rights Act or abolishing the Dis-
trict's council altogether. This is the omnipresent threat, the deep reality,
that Seidman avoids but that makes the current regime anti-democratic and
ultimately intolerable.
It is true, as evidenced by Clarke, that this or that victory in court occa-
sionally can be won against federal interference with local affairs that vio-
lates other constitutional rights or principles. Perhaps "competent
lawyering could produce comparable, albeit different, arguments to combat
other threats to home rule."53 But understanding the severe limitations of
this approach is more important. Even if the District successfully litigated
every case in which Congress violated the constitutional rights of its citizens,
the citizens of the District as a political community would have nothing like
the political rights of the citizens of a State. The basic assumption of both the
District clause and the Home Rule charter is that Congress has the authority
to legislate on any local matters in any way it deems fit within the side con-
straints of other constitutional principles. The District's best friend on the
District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Mikva, captures this fundamental
reality:
When ... Congress acts in its purely local capacity, courts simply
do not possess the tools or the standards to police the congressional
action via anything other than the constitutional strictures ordina-
rily applicable to state legislative action, even if the disenfranchise-
ment of District residents makes it just as likely that Congress has
acted without due regard to the interests of those residents in passing
local, as well as national legislation. If there is 'bite' to the 'ten
miles squared' provision it is in this respect ....""
Thus, Seidman's approach of litigating federal injuries to citizens of the
District will work only in exceptional cases, like Clarke, when other consti-
tutional rights are offended. 5 In this way, nothing will be achieved against
52. Seidman, supra note 3, at 399-400. Seidman's arguments about equal protection and
due process are far less compelling given the emasculation of the principles as applied to the
District. See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
53. Seidman, supra note 3, at 400.
54. United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Mikva, J., concurring)
(emphasis supplied).
55. Even there, Seidman probably overstates his case, given the steady judicial retreat
from the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions." See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
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the ordinary course of congressional legislation for District affairs. More to
the point, combatting "threats to home rule" in court constitutes an essen-
tially defensive and timid posture that does not equal self-government and
never will achieve statehood or equality. As a political strategy for libera-
tion from the antiquated arrangements of the District clause, this approach
invests far too much faith in litigation while ignoring the central political
processes already set into motion by the statehood initiative.
Professor Seidman's eagerness to deduce an "anti-domination" principle
from a generally unavailing body of constitutional case law leads him to
somewhat surprising results, such as his solemn assurance that "[T]he Con-
stitution does not permit the government to show contempt for its citizens
even when, indeed, especially when, they are excluded from the political pro-
cess."56 Professor Seidman cites no live authority for this remarkable propo-
sition in the text of the Constitution or constitutional case law.57 But, absent
specific constitutional prohibitions, much of American constitutional history
cuts in exactly the opposite direction with respect to official state contempt
for excluded or minority citizens.
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's pro-slavery, anti-African-
American Dred Scott decision;5" its upholding of the racist detention and
internment of Japanese-Americans in Korematsu v. United States,"9 its ap-
proval of anti-sodomy statutes as applied to homosexuals in Bowers v. Hard-
wick; " or almost any case relating to the rights of American citizens living
in prison. All of these major decisions have permitted "the government to
show contempt for its citizens even when, indeed, especially when, they are
excluded from the political process." 6' Indeed, the Supreme Court would
not have handed down any of these three decisions against those generally
included in the political process: white heterosexual Americans not living in
prison. In Bowers, the Supreme Court went so far as to read into the chal-
lenged state statute a nonexistent qualification limiting application of the
TIONAL LAW 681-85 (2d ed. 1988) (discussion of the "now somewhat eroded twentieth cen-
tury doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions' ").
56. Seidman, supra note 3, at 400.
57. The only citation is to United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
but Cohen essentially overruled this decision. In Cohen, the court held that "[w]e do disap-
prove ... the rationale expressed in that decision ... that distinctive legislative treatment of
the District is 'particularly suspect' and thus requires more than a rational basis to support it.
We reject that concept whether applied to legislation that is assertedly 'local' or assertedly
'national' .... Cohen, 733 F.2d at 136 n. 12.
58. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
59. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
60. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
61. Seidman, supra note 3, at 400; see also supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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statute to homosexuals.62 As a general matter, official contempt for citizens
excluded from the political process has been permitted absent a violation of
an extrinsic constitutional prohibition or right.63
Professor Seidman's "anti-domination" principle makes good democratic
politics but bad constitutional law, and the two ought not be confused.
Those seeking freedom from unjust arrangements should approach courts
with a deadly sober recognition of what is possible and what is not. What is
clearly not possible is abolition of the current regime of domination through
appeal to vague constitutional principles in the court. What is possible,
however, is statehood, and the statehood movement is currently engaging in
the decisive battle against political domination.
Yet, strangely again, Professor Seidman dismisses the significance of state-
hood, ignoring that only through statehood have formerly locked-out and
subjugated groups and regions in the United States won their freedom from
federal domination and their political equality as communities.64 Reluc-
tantly conceding that "arguments resting on the anti-domination principle
may not ultimately prevail" in court, he goes on to state that "the crucial
point is this: without such a principle, the District's status would remain un-
changed even if it secured statehood. The legal guarantee of unconditional
state sovereignty also rests on the anti-domination principle. Thus, without
such a principle, statehood would be useless ....
But the realities of the American political system do not sustain Professor
Seidman's extreme skeoticism about the significance of statehood. The inex-
istence of an inherent "anti-domination" doctrine in American constitu-
tional law does not render statehood "useless"; it is what makes statehood
necessary. Only the raw currency of political power achieved through state-
hood can protect an American community from the injuries and indignities
visited upon it by an essentially foreign sovereign. 66 As the District of Co-
lumbia circuit noted in United States v. Thompson: "Minorities can usually
62. 478 U.S. at 188 & n.I.
63. Even with regard to the republican guaranty clause, which would most closely furnish
the substance for a constitutional "anti-domination" principle, the Supreme Court from the
very beginning has refused to judge whether the existing political structure is guaranteeing
authentic democratic access and processes. In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849),
the Supreme Court held that a federal court could not determine which of two competing state
governments from Rhode Island was properly representative. Instead, the court held, republi-
can representation is a political question that should be decided by the people through their
representatives in Congress.
64. H.R. REP. No. 305, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-20 (1987) (history of statehood).
65. Seidman, supra note 3, at 403.
66. Thus, the end of the brief reign of National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), brought on by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985),
underscores, as opposed to diminishes, the necessity for statehood: "State sovereign interests
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protect themselves by playing their role in the political process and forming
coalition with other groups to secure a majority., 67
But Seidman questions the efficacy of this political insurance policy, which
is perhaps the lynchpin of vertical federalism in America. He suggests that
"[i]f enough representatives from other States undervalue the welfare of in-
habitants of the District, or do not bother with a dialogue with District rep-
resentatives concerning the public good, then they will simply outvote the
District's representatives. '6 But, of course, this unlikely ganging-up scena-
rio could apply equally to any other State. Yet Seidman worries that "Dis-
trict representatives might be forced to devote a disproportionate amount of
their time and resources to maintaining self-government,, 69 which leads to
his even more extreme anxiety that "the price of home rule might be relative
disenfranchisement on other national issues."7 Such fears seem greatly mis-
placed given the ready assimilation of representatives of new states into
America's legislative institutions even after hysterical and racist campaigns
are waged in Congress.7'
At bottom, Seidman doubts the ability of "logrolling" to preserve New
Columbia's self-determination. 72 He anticipates that the District's "repre-
sentatives may be restricted by the ideological commitments of their constit-
uents," but does not explain why this would be any worse of a problem for
District representatives than for the representatives of any other States. 73 He
also seems to misread the real nature of legislative logrolling when he ex-
presses concern about its "formidable enforcement difficulties."74 He asks:
"How is the District Representative to know that the Iowa delegation will
make good on its promise to support home rule in exchange for votes on
farm legislation?" But votes in Congress are usually not explicitly quid pro
quo. Rather, they flow in a succession of endlessly shifting coalitions and
alliances, a fluid system that favors those who make no permanent enemies
(at least without good cause). Gratuitous interference with the local affairs
of another State almost always amounts to a major political blunder in the
...are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the
federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power." Id. at 552.
67. 452 F.2d 1333, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
68. Seidman, supra note 3, at 409.
69. Id. at 410.
70. Id.
71. See generally R. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM 1874-1893 (1963); Wil-
kinson, Land Tenure In The Pacific: The Context For Native Hawaiian Land Rights, 64
WASH. L. REV. 227, 230 n.18 (1989).
72. Seidman, supra note 3, at 411-12.
73. Id. at 411.
74. Id. at 412.
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"Gentlemen's Club" of the Senate. A member simply cannot afford to alien-
ate indefinitely two of his or her colleagues in order to pursue a vendetta
against the population of another State. This irrational behavior by a Sena-
tor would elevate animosity towards another State over the interests of his or
her home State's constituents and, thus, his or her own chances of re-elec-
tion. At any rate, why a majority of both Houses of Congress would place
principle over politics by approving statehood for New Columbia and then
choose to override all of the principles of constitutional federalism by inter-
vening in the local population's affairs all over again is difficult to see. For
any lingering District-bashers, the mere physical presence of New Columbia
representatives on the floor of the Senate would radically change the political
cost-benefit calculus attending to the politics of diatribe and denunciation.7"
This deterrent factor has even more weight given the back-up power of
filibuster.
Beyond these powerful institutional constraints, representatives from New
Columbia will carry with them many special advantages against the possibil-
ity of continuing federal insult, interference, and domination. First, the geo-
graphic proximity of New Columbia to the federal enclave guarantees that a
strong reaction from the local population and local press corps, which
doubles as the national press corps, will make the political costs of discrimi-
natory legislation far higher than any conceivable benefit. Second, the repre-
sentatives from New Columbia, likely living minutes from their offices, will
theoretically devote more time to institutional and committee politics and
less to constant travel back and forth across the country, increasing their
importance and influence on Capitol Hill. Third, the representatives of New
Columbia could make certain causes common with other representatives
from the region because they will share many interests with the representa-
tives of Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, and other similarly situated States.
Furthermore, there are more direct political checks against continuing
domination. The heavily Democratic political orientation of New Columbia
will certainly count in its favor, at least in today's Democratically-controlled
legislative bodies. The House and Senate leadership, already committed to
statehood, will surely defend nonintervention as a general matter of partisan
political solidarity. Also, members of Congress seeking the Presidency will
treat respectfully New Columbia's representatives. Finally, the likelihood
that the foundation of New Columbia will result in the racial integration of
the presently all-white United States Senate will give America's growing mi-
nority communities national legislative leaders in whom millions of Ameri-
75. The presence on the House floor of the District's non-voting delegate, Walter Faun-
troy, perhaps explains why the District has fared somewhat better in that body.
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cans throughout every State can place their hopes. District-bashing would
assume a much different meaning given this situation.
Of course, enumerating all of the formal and informal checks against
domination of the people of one State by the representatives of the others
would be impossible. But American political history strongly attests to the
prevalence of these constraints. In general, the people and the representa-
tives of states, whatever their political leanings, treat one another as equals
within the constitutional system.7 6 Surely this sense of common membership
in a single political community was one of the benefits contemplated during
the construction of the American bicameral legislative system. "If the resi-
dents of the District do not need the parochial protection of elected repre-
sentatives to the Congress to participate in the logrolling that protects one
state from being overrun by the others, it is hard to understand why the
framers fought so hard to assure that even the smallest state was allotted two
senators and at least one voting representative.",
77
Professor Seidman closes his article by suggesting that the desired "end is
full incorporation of the District and its residents into the national political
community" and that this end can be achieved "only if the country as a
whole begins to understand that District residents are morally entitled to
self-determination. ' 78 He sees "the demand for statehood" as "a tool for
achieving that end, and the realization of statehood will signal its achieve-
ment. Yet statehood is not the end itself."
79
However, statehood is the real end. Without it, the citizens of the District
cannot be fully incorporated into the national political community. Profes-
sor Seidman's postulate reverses the usual order in which disenfranchised
groups have won political and moral recognition. Statehood - whether that
of Californians, Kansans, Lithuanians, or Israelis - is achieved through
political struggle: petition, organizing, complaint, resistance, protest, civil
disobedience, threats to leave political parties, revolution, and then, often,
explicit deal-making. Moral recognition by other members of the national
community follows the success of political struggle for membership as
equals in the national community. The history of State admissions to the
Union is filled with "pairs" of States admitted as a political compromise
76. This tradition of respect is founded on a strong legal and constitutional basis. As
Professor Schrag points out, the states cannot cannot revoke another state's admission or di-
minish its political rights within the constitutional system. See Schrag, supra note 4, at 344.
77. United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Mikva, J., concurring in
judgment).




between the parties, a formula last seen in the Hawaii-Alaska deal."° Mutual
respect and participatory inclusion in the political community are not the
preconditions for statehood. Although dividing the liberation project this
way seems overly formalistic, statehood is more likely the precondition for
mutual respect and participatory inclusion in the political community. Iron-
ically, by trying to dilute the significance of statehood in favor of "the strug-
gle itself,"8" Professor Seidman waters down the only positive goal that can
actually motivate the District population to rebel against the current legal
and political regime.
III. STEPPING FORWARD WITH STATEHOOD
Recognizing the ultimate "revocability of any reform not entrenched or
perpetuated either by constitutional amendment or by admission of the Dis-
trict to the Union," Professor Schrag understands that "statehood represents
the best way of permanently securing for our fellow Americans in the Na-
tion's Capital the political privileges that we who live in the fifty States have
always taken for granted."8 2
But, as a strategic matter, Professor Schrag proposes to move the state-
hood process backwards. On November 4, 1980, more than 151,000 citizens
from the District's eight wards voted in a referendum to approve the District
of Columbia Statehood Constitutional Convention Initiative, which acti-
vated the statehood admission process.8 3 This popular mandate, in which
three-fifths of the voters said "aye," clearly demonstrated the will of the
American citizens living in the District. Then, on November 2, 1982, over
110,000 residents participated in another referendum that ratified the New
Columbia Constitution 4 which had been adopted and signed by the Consti-
tutional Convention on May 29, 1982.85 The District Council formally peti-
tioned Congress for statehood on September 12, 1983, and statehood
legislation was referred to the House of Representatives Committee on the
District of Columbia, 6 which reported the legislation favorably on Septem-
ber 17, 1987.87 At this point, with election of the "Tennessee Plan" Senators
80. See generally W. HUNT, ALASKA, A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY (1976).
81. Seidman, supra note 3, at 414.
82. Schrag, supra note 4, at 353-54.
83. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-111 (1987) (accompanying legislative history).
84. Of the District residents voting, 52.8% voted in favor of, and 47.2% voted against
passage of the Constitution. 29 D.C. REG. 5253 (1982).
85. District of Columbia Statehood Constitutional Convention Transcript 142-52 (May
29, 1982).
86. H.R. REP. No. 305, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1987) (chronology of New Columbia's
Petition for Statehood).
87. Id. at 19.
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and House Representative scheduled for November, the game plan should be
to step up public pressure, legislative lobbying, and mass education.
But Professor Schrag, revisiting the choice between statehood and incre-
mental reform, believes that
the people should be asked to decide whether they really want
statehood, taking into account the likelihood that they will have to
work harder to achieve it in the coming decade than they have to
this point and that pressing for statehood may require foregoing
other reforms that could undermine the District's moral claim to
admission to the Union."8
But the two popular referenda that have already taken place should be suffi-
cient to indicate that the people "really want statehood" and that they are
deeply frustrated with the indignities of domination and the weakness and
futility of a Sisyphean reform agenda.
Professor Schrag draws a gloomy picture of the state of the statehood
cause, finding:
an apparent lack of interest in the District itself. Aside from the
lobbying efforts of Delegate Walter Fauntroy, the speeches of Rev-
erend Jesse Jackson, and the educational endeavors of a stalwart
band of activists who comprise the Statehood Commission, the
statehood issue has been barely visible since 1982. Until Reverend
Jackson suggested his interest in running to become one of the Dis-
trict's 'Senators,' District newspapers and radio stations rarely dis-
cussed the issue. Few voluntary organizations have pressed for, or
even endorsed, statehood. There have been no mass demonstra-
tions supporting the concept. The Council has repeatedly post-
poned the elections, which the people had called for in their 1980
initiative, for a Representative and Senators who would become
highly visible advocates for statehood on Capitol Hill. 9
These observations are not entirely inaccurate but they fail to capture the
new political momentum of the statehood movement and the new political
realities framing the question of power and powerlessness in the District.
The central backdrop to the statehood question now is an astonishing in-
ternational movement towards democratic transformation that includes the
dissolution of imperial and neo-colonial systems, extraordinary episodes of
national liberation, the ouster of dictators, and the rapid spread of political
self-determination and democratic practices.9" With this remarkable spirit of
88. Schrag, supra note 4, at 352.
89. Id. at 351-52. (footnotes omitted).
90. The collapse of bureaucratic state socialism and communism in Eastern Europe, the
steady liberalization of the Soviet Union, the recently gained independence of Namibia, the fall
of Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Ferdinand Marcos in the Phillipines, and the spread of free
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freedom and democracy transforming political arrangements around the
world, the anomalous and oppressed sitation of the people of the District
cries out for action. Colonial rule in the very Capital of the Nation purport-
edly leading the world to democracy simply cannot survive, especially given
the racial dynamics of the District's domination that are never far from the
surface. The contradictions of the current situation are just too
overwhelming.
At the same time, the widely publicized arrest and (self-proclaimed) re-
pentance of Mayor Marion Barry may have the effect of ending the anti-
District fervor that held sway in Congress during the last decade.9" The
close of this saddening episode will finally allow the terms of the political
debate to shift from demagoguery to principle. At any rate, the judical sys-
tem of this Nation rejects both guilt by association and collective guilt for
individual acts. Therefore, using Mayor Barry's misfortunes as an excuse for
denying democracy to the District's 650,000 citizens reflects political oppor-
tunism and a manifestation of the colonial mentality.
Last year's arrival in the District of Reverend Jackson means that these
new openings will not be lost. A national political leader and two-time presi-
dential candidate with a famous ability to make complex issues both morally
and politically cogent, Reverend Jackson has made statehood a leading pri-
ority of the National Rainbow Coalition, which opened a local office in Janu-
ary 1990 to work full-time on the issue.9 2 The first visible achievement of
this statehood project was the Council's vote to proceed with the election of
"shadow representatives" under the Tennessee plan, a move that had been
postponed four times for apparently self-serving and narrow political inter-
ests.93 The shadow delegation lobbying full-time on statehood for New Co-
lumbia will furnish a tremendous boost to the statehood movement.
Delegate Fauntroy's decision to run for Mayor will also open up the Dele-
gate's seat for the first time since its inception to new ideas and for new
leadership to build on his accomplishments.94
On the national level, statehood has begun to resurface as an issue and
promises to be a pivotal topic in the 1992 Presidential campaign. With sup-
porters in every State and congressional district, Reverend Jackson and the
and authentic elections throughout the third world all come to mind. See Dissent, Revolution
in Europe (Spring 1990) (an excellent overview of the global turn towards democracy).
91. See LaFraniere, supra note 25.
92. Jackson Opens A Drive For Capital Statehood, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, § 1.
93. See D.C. Votes 'Shadow' Lobbyist; Council Clears Way for Jackson to Run for State-
hood Post, Wash. Post, Mar. 28, 1990, at Al, col.l.
94. Melton, Fauntroy Takes the Wraps Off His Campaign, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1990, at
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Rainbow Coalition have unique access to the national media and the Demo-
cratic leadership of both Houses of Congress.95 By bypassing the Mayoral
race, which many had urged him to enter, Reverend Jackson also will have
the time and the unified political backing of District leaders needed to press
his national political strategy for statehood. The apparent surge of the Pu-
erto Rican statehood movement and President Bush's declared support for
the cause (despite the fact that Puerto Ricans have not even petitioned for
statehood) make very tangible the possibility of a legislative deal along the
lines of the one that brought Alaska and Hawaii into the Union.
Of course, the statehood process is not, and should not be, a one-man
show. But Professor Schrag overstates the disengagement of the District
population. The recent proposals by conservative Republican Congressmen
Regula and Parris, unlikely champions for the enfranchisement of District
residents, could only have emerged at a moment when statehood appears to
be gaining momentum in their eyes.9 6 . Their proposals have further stimu-
lated controversy and interest in the fate of the District, not just within its
borders but in Maryland and Virginia as well.
Professor Schrag is right to emphasize the absence of mass demonstra-
tions, which is perhaps the principal missing ingredient in the current move-
ment.97 Delegate Fauntroy's proposal for District residents to withold
federal income taxes as a form of civil disobedience was not so much wrong
in principle as politically premature. Civil disobedience usually must follow
a period of mass organizing and legal protest, all of the dramatic public man-
ifestations of a people in motion for freedom. The people of the District are
not yet at that point. Therefore, a series of mass demonstrations beginning
with a march on Washington for Washington by Washington's residents
seems in order. Such an event requires a galvanizing of students at local
campuses, strong direction offered by church leaders, and a willingness by
locally elected public officials to set aside narrow personal agendas for the
greater good of political emancipation.
As part of the movement to equality through statehood, the people of the
District should carefully consider Representative Stan Parris' National Capi-
95. Reverend Jackson will be hosting his own nationally syndicated television show begin-
ning in the fall of 1990.
96. H.R. 4195, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 136 CONG. REC. H646 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1990) (legislation introduced by Rep. Regula providing the District of Columbia retrocession
to Maryland); H.R. 4193, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 136 CONG. REC. H646 (daily ed. Mar.
6, 1990) (legislation introduced by Rep. Parris providing District residents with voting rights
in Maryland).
97. Schrag, supra note 4, at 351.
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tal Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1990.98 Although Representative Parris
has traditionally been an outspoken foe of District automony, and therefore
anathema in District politics, his proposal for the District's participation in
congressional elections in Maryland may offer the best intermediate tactical
step to full statehood for New Columbia.99 Parris' proposal would maintain
the District of Columbia Home Rule government but would provide for the
District population's participation in the election of United States Senators
and Representatives from Maryland and for its participation in the Mary-
land electoral college. The proposal would therefore eliminate the District's
nonvoting delegate and would correspond with other legislation introduced
by Parris that would repeal the twenty-third amendment,"° which gives
District residents representation in the electoral college.101
The principal advantage of this proposal is that, for the first time since
1800, the District residents would have voting representation in Congress
and thereby real leverage and leadership for their statehood drive, while pre-
serving whatever amount of integrity remains with their local govern-
ment. 1 2 District participation in federal elections in Maryland would mean,
at the very least, that a District populace unified in its support for statehood
would be able to trade electoral support in Maryland Senate campaigns for
their Senators' pledge to fight for statehood for New Columbia. At best,
Maryland voters would elect one (or both) Senators from the District side, a
Senator who could fight and vote for statehood: In addition, District resi-
dents would be exchanging one nonvoting delegate for at least one voting
Representative in the House and probable participation in other Maryland
House races. 10 3 Meanwhile, local issues would continue to be decided locally
98. H.R. 4193, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); see also Jenkins, Parris Would Let D.C Vote
in Maryland Senate Race, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 1990, at D1.
99. Representative Parris views his proposal as a "reasonable compromise" between those
individuals who are completely opposed of District of Columbia statehood and those who are
strongly in favor of statehood and representation in Congress. See 136 CONG. REC. H617
(daily ed. Mar. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Parris). Statehood advocates who cannot imagine
supporting Representative Parris on anything can take heart and be gratified that their work
produced his sudden recognition, after several decades in public life, that District residents
even have civil rights that need restoration.
100. H.R.J. RES. 504, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (also introduced by Rep. Parris).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. This latter provision has the transparently partisan con-
sequence of removing three electoral votes from the District while adding only one to
Maryland.
102. This advantage is not true of Representative Regula's proposal simply to retrocede the
lands of the District, minus the Federal Enclave, to Maryland. This proposal disregards the
likely wishes of both Maryland and District residents, populations which are fiercely and justi-
fiably proud of their own historic political communities and boundaries, and is therefore prob-
ably not politically feasible.
103. See H.R. 4193, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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as much as they ever were, and the statehood movement and transition pro-
cess could continue, but now with the added force of serious national legisla-
tive leaders working for the cause of their electoral constituents. The
statehood movement and the citizens of the District, who have not been rep-
resented in the United States Senate for 190 years, can only benefit from the
enhanced political status and influence that the Parris bill would produce.
This proposal is certainly not to be dismissed out of hand and should be
considered seriously as a potentially crucial and major step towards state-
hood, but only as a step.
In the end, we must return to the justice and logic of the statehood cause.
In American history, three questions are asked of a territory seeking political
self-determination through statehood. "Does the territory have the prereq-
uisite population and resources? Do the people of the territory desire state-
hood? Do the citizens have a commitment to democracy?"' 104 As Reverend
Jackson asserts, the future citizens of New Columbia, who already surpass in
number the populations of each of five states, surely possess the population
and resources to support statehood. The people of the District and their
elected representatives have also repeatedly expressed their desire for state-
hood. And, as for their commitment to democracy, who could question the
democratic devotion of more than 600,000 citizens who continue to pay fed-
eral taxes, fight and die for their country, and obey national laws, but in
1990 have no voting representation in Congress and no real powers of self-
government? The real question to be posed is not whether the citizens of the
District are committed to democracy, but whether the rest of the country is
in fact committed to democracy for the citizens of the District.
104. H.R. REP. No. 305, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1987) (summary of debate during
hearings and markup).
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